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ABSTRACT
The MACE model of Canada employs a nested production
structure in which there is a vintage bundle of capital and
energy that is combined with efficiency units of labour to
define potential output for given quantities of employed
factors. The actual level of output is derived from an estimated
utilization-rate equation, in which the ratio of actual to
potential output depends on unexpected sales, profitability, and
the gap between actual and desired inventories. Using this
production structure, it is possible to attribute 30% of the
decline in labour productivity between 1973 and 1982, relative
to a steady growth case, to desired substitution of labour for
energy, one-third to unexpectedly low demand, and one-fifth to
low profitability. The unexplained residual is less than one—
fifth. The macroeconomic structure of the model is then used to
trace the underlying reasons for the differences between steady
growth and actual history. It is concluded that most of the
changes in factor proportions, demand, and profitability in
Canada were due to the changes in world oil prices and the
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1. Introduction
This paper is an exercise in cliometrics, the name
coined to describe the application of econometrics to the
interpretation of history. It differs from most other
quantitative economic history in both topic and methodology.
The topic is unusual in its breadth and its currency; indeed
it may be stretching things a bit to treat 1982 as history
when the complete national accounts data are not yet
published. In this regard, I am heartened that W. A.
Mackintosh himself completed the first draft of his
insightful historical chapter on "The Course of Depresssion
and Recovery, 1929—1938" (Chapter 6 of Mackintosh, 1964) in
August 1938, and had the work in final form by the spring of
1939.
In terms of scope, I am trying to explain why the
Canadian history of growth, unemployment, inflation and
productivity from 1974 through 1982 was so different from
that of the preceding twenty years.
1Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. An
earlier version of this paper was given as a W.A. Mackintosh
Lecture at Queen's University, on March 10, 1983. I am
grateful to the members of the Economics Department at
Queen's for their hospitality, encouragement and helpful
comments. In preparing the paper, I have had invaluable
collaboration and research assistance from Mary MacGregor,
Andre Plourde, and Alan Chung. I am also grateful for
financial assistance from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.2
The usual procedure in quantitative studies of economic
history is to establish an empirical framework, most often
partial in nature, in which the effect of a particular policy
or event can be assessed. If one starts, as I do, with a
quantitative model2 that pretends to explain all of the main
economic aggregates by means of estimated behaviour equations
and relatively few exogenous variables, then it is tempting
to take a more ambitious approach. This involves first the
creation of a hypothetical history in which all of the
foreign variables and domestic policies are set on smooth
surprise-free paths from 1974 to 1982, and second deriving
results showing how the Canadian economy would have evolved
over the past nine years. It is then possible to add back,
either separately or in groups, the various external and
internal disturbances that have taken place since 1973, and
thus to explain their likely impact on the economy. To the
extent that the final results differ from history, even after
all of the identified shocks have been accounted for, there
remains a puzzle for future research.
If the hypothetical history with smoothly growing
exogenous variables settles down to a smooth growth path, and
2 shall be using the MACE model, for which the fullest
description of structure and properties is Helliwell et al
(1983). Helliwell, Boothe and McRae (1982) also contains all
the equations of the model and an assessment of the
macroeconomic effects of alternative Canadian energy pricing
policies during the 1970s. The Appendix to this paper
contains the model's equations for output, potential output
and factor demands. These equations make up almost half of
the model's structure, and are especially important for the
analysis of productivity.if adding the effects of identified shocks should serve to
explain most of the gyrations of actual history, then a case
can be made that the basic behavioural structure of the
Canadian economy has not altered dramatically. If that is
what the evidence should indicate, there are important
implications for economic policy and for the interpretation
of history. It would mean, for example, that the stagflation
of the 1970s was not an inexplicable phenomenon rendering
obsolete any quantitative models based on the experience of
the 1950s and 1960s. It would also mean that the sharp
post-1973 drops in productivity growth, as measured by output
per employee, do not represent a collapse in the rate of
technical progress, or a drop in the competitiveness and
efficiency of Canadian industry, but are the expected result
of the external shocks and internal policies that have
occurred since 1973.
I shall first present some key features of the Canadian
economy from 1974 to 1982 under three alternative histories:
the hypothetical shock-free economy, actual history, and the
model results including the effects of identified shocks.
Section 3 examines the sources of productivity change in some
detail, separates the effects of capacity utilization from
those of changes in factor prices, and assesses the extent to
which there remains, at the aggregate level, a productivity
problem or puzzle to be explained. The results in that
section will be mainly drawn from the supply side of the MACE
model, the equations of which are contained in the Appendix.
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Section 4 digs deeper into the external causes of the
stagflation and productivity decline by using the whole MACE
model to assess the separate and joint effects of the OPEC
oil price shocks and the post—1973 stagflation in the
industrial countries of the OECD.
Section 5 turns to the impact of domestic policies,
including the 1976—78 Anti—Inflation Board, fiscal policies,
monetary and exchange rate policies, and Canadian energy
pricing policies. The results obtained by adding all of the
shocks and policies to the steady growth environment are
described in section 2 as "model with shocks". Any
differences between these results and what actually happened
(called "Actual History" in the tables) represent the failure
of the model to explain all that happened. These errors may
be due to structural changes, measurement errors,
specification errors, or random disturbances, and provide an
interesting menu for further research.
2. Alternative Histories
To construct a complete picture of how the Canadian
economy would have evolved in the absence of OPEC and other
1970s shocks to the domestic and world economies, one needs
an estimated econometric model plus a certain amount of
artistic licence. The latter is required because there are a
number of particular features of the economy that were well
out of equilibrium in 1974, the first year of the new "steady
growth" regime, and there are always a number of relativelyminor aspects of the model (e.g., exogenous determination of
energy exports, the setting of pipeline tariffs, etc.) that
are not completely applicable to the no-OPEC world. The
policy assumption adopted for the transition to steady growth
was one of the "cold shower" rather than of policy
gradualism. All government spending was set to grow from 1974
on at 2%, in real terms, or roughly 1% per capita. World oil
prices, and all prices of energy imports and exports, in
terms of U.s. dollars, are set to grow at 2% plus the U.S.
rate of inflation. United States and OECD real incomes and
prices are set to grow at their 1952-73 averages. Direct and
indirect tax rates are set at their 1973 values, interest
rates are determined by an estimated monetary policy reaction
function (in which the target interest rate depends chiefly
on U.S. interest rates, with additional impacts from the
stock of foreign reserves and the rate of growth of the money
supply), and the exchange rate is determined by
market—clearing forces modified by an official intervention
policy based on "leaning against the wind". Given the
policy—determined interest rate, the government deficit is
then financed by whatever mix of bonds and money is needed to
satisfy the demand for money. Domestic city-gate crude oil
and natural gas prices are set throughout the 1974-82 period
at 100% of btu parity with imported crude oil.
This combination of spending and world price assumptions
requires a fairly sharp deceleration of the 197 1-73 rates of
growth of income and prices. After a "hangover" year in 1974,
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with below average real growth and above average inflation,
the rate of real GNP growth fairly quickly settles down to an
average of about 4.5%, with an inflation rate of about 3.5%
and monetary growth of about 7%. The unemployment rate varies
narrowly in the 5.1% to 5.25% range. The wage equation
involves a real wage that grows about 1% faster than the 2%
constant annual rate of growth of the labour efficiency
index. If the steady growth simulation is extended through
the rest of the 1980s this "real wage creep" eventually leads
to somewhat higher rates of inflation, interest rates, and
unemployment, but these changes are not dramatic, and do not
affect the results over the 1974—82 period.
The current account of the balance of payments in the
steady growth case has an annual deficit, which is matched by
private capital inflows, that varies in the $2.1 to $3.3
billion range (measured in current dollars). This involves a
foreign debt that grows (like the government debt) less fast
than GNP, causing the ratio of foreign debt (at market value)
to nominal GNP to fall from about 50% in 1974 to just under
40% at the end of 1982.
Although the world price of crude oil is assumed to grow
annually at 5% per annum from its 1973 base (reaching the
lofty level of $US 3.43 per barrel by 1982), the domestic
markups for oil and natural gas do not rise as fast as the
rate of inflation, so that the overall price index for energy
rises slightly less fast than the general price index andsubstantially less fast than the real wage. This leads to a
continuation of the pre-1973 trend of increasing use of
energy relative to capital and, especially, the continuing
substitution of energy for labour. Between 1974 and 1982 the
use of energy per employee in the steady growth case
increases by 38%, while the use of energy per unit of GNP
rises by 17%.
As can be seen from the summary statistics presented in
Table 2.1, steady growth gives remarkably better performance
than was actually obtained. By 1981, actual GNP was more than
11% below the steady growth path, and in 1982 this gap
widened to 18%. Cumulated actual real GNP between 1974 and
1982 was 91 billion 1971$ less than in the steady growth
alternative. This shortfall amounts to more than 8 months of
GNP at 1982 production levels. The 1982 steady growth
unemployment rate is 5.1%, less than half the 10.8% rate
actually experienced. The steady growth case also has much
less inflation, with a 1982 price level 40% below the actual
one.
The natural reaction to the comparison of the actual and
the steady growth results is to treat the steady growth
numbers as pie-in-the-sky projections based on blind
extrapolation of past relationships that have no reference to
the 1970s and 1980s. In one important sense, that reaction is
justified, in that there is no way that Canada could have
escaped or even materially altered the world economic
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conditions of the time, and hence no means whereby the steady
growth path could actually have been achieved. However, the
purpose of the projections is to show what the 1970s and
1980s would have been like if world conditions and domestic
policies had followed stable paths. The realism of the
hypothetical path cannot be disputed on the grounds that
actual history has been different. A more appropriate test is
to add back the effects of the external and internal
disturbances, and then see to what extent the resulting
figures capture the broad features, and even the detail, of
what has actually happened.
The figures in the right—hand column of Table 2.1 show
the extent to which allowing for specific external
disturbances and internal policies helps to explain the large
divergences between the steady growth case and what actually
happened. The figures are calculated by taking the difference
between the steady growth and "model with shocks" results as
a percentage of the difference between the steady growth and
actual results. The figures show that the largest parts of
the changes are attributable to the various shocks and
policies. Since the real declines are slightly
under—explained, while the price level differences are
over-explained, it can be inferred that the overall impact of
excluded or residual factors has been to reduce both output
and inflation below what they otherwise would have been.The figures are reported for both 1981 and 1982, in part
because final figures for 1982 are not yet available, but
also to show that the model mechanisms and the external
shocks are better able to explain the 1974 to 1981 period
than the sharp drop in demand and output between 1981 and
1982. Both years are outside the model's estimation period,
which ended in 1980. Even in 1982, domestic final spending
(made up of C +I+G,but excluding inventory investment) is
more closely captured than is output. The reason, as will be
discussed further in the next section, is that the actual
inventories decreased by 2.8 billion 1971$ in 1982, while the
model with shocks forecasted that they would have risen by
3.7 billion 1971$ in the face of the largely unexpected drop
in sales.
The next section will deal in more detail with output
and factor inputs. It is a prelude to section 4 which
disentangles the effects of the various shocks and policies.
3. Productivity, Factor Demands, and Capacity Utilization
The most commonly quoted measure of productivity is that
of output per employee. At the aggregate level, it is common
to use GNP as the output measure. However, as has been
pointed out often (e.g., Department of Finance, 1980), gross
domestic product is more appropriate, since it measures the
output of factors employed in Canada. For Canada, GDP is
larger than GNP, since Canada is a net debtor. In developing
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the production structure of the MACE model, which is shown in
detail in the appendix, we further refined the output measure
to remove indirect taxes and to add net energy imports to
give the gross output, at factor cost, of the energy-using
sectors.
The production function includes three factors: energy
and capital are bundled together in a vintage CES
sub-function, and this capital-plus-energy bundle is combined
with efficiency units of labour in a Cobb-Douglas outer
function. Because changes in utilization rates for employed
factors are important in our sample period, we could assume
only that the functions held on average over the sample
period. We chose a relatively simple functional form, and
introduced additional flexibility and accuracy by bundling
capital and energy in the manner supported by other research
results (e.g., Berndt and Wood, 1979). We were then able to
use sample averages, trends, factor share ratios, and the
requirement that relative factor use ratios should equal
their optimal values on average over the sample period, to
determine many of the parameters. We used direct econometric
estimation of the factor demand equations to determine two
key unknown parameters, as well as to establish the
adjustment speeds and expectations processes that play such
an important role in factor demands. The two key parameters
are the elasticity of substitution (sigma=0.6) between
capital and energy, and the annual rate (delta2=0.72) at
which energy/capital proportions become malleable in thevintage bundle.
Since many analysts have concluded that there has been a
post-1973 drop in productivity growth, measured in one or
more ways, we attempted to see whether any such break
appeared in our production structure. A sequence of tests was
done using secondary technical progess terms starting in each
year from 1971 to 1978. The tests were done (as described in
Helliwell et al, 1983) both with and without the other
variables determining the level of production, and in no case
was there a break in technical progress that was either large
or significant. Thus it would appear that our separation of
the energy and non-energy sectors, along with the explicit
inclusion of energy in the production function of the
non—energy sector, eliminates any significant 1970s break in
total factor productivity in the energy—using sector.
The synthetic output measure (qsv) is obtained by
combining actual employment with the vintage capital/energy
bundle (key). The MACE model contains an explicit equation
for the production decision, with inventory change determined
residually. The production decision is estimated as a
utilization rate decision (q/qsv is the utilization rate),
with the determining variables being the ratio of final sales
to qsv, the ratio of desired to actual inventories, and the
ratio of current costs to the price of output. The latter
variable, cq, is an inverse measure of profitability.
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Both sales and profitability have had strong impacts on
the output decision, thereby supporting our initial
assumption that there were significant economically
determined departures of output from the level indicated by a
production function based on measured factor inputs. Given
the production and factor utilization structure described
above, it is natural and potentially rewarding to use it to
attempt to disentangle the causes of the drop in productivity
growth in the post-1973 period. In this section, we shall
divide the causes among changes in factor proportions,
changes in demand conditions, and changes in profitability,
and shall leave the explanation of the causes of the changes
in demand conditions and profitability until the next
section.
As can be seen from Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1, actual
output per employee was 10% below the steady growth case in
1981, and 13.4% below in 1982. The productivity definition
can conveniently be decomposed into two parts, one reflecting
the mix of factors and the second being the overall factor
utilization rate:3
q/ne =(qsv/ne)*(q/qsv)
As is shown in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1, 4.4% of the 10%
1981 productivity drop, relative to the steady growth case,
was due to changes in the factor mix, and the rest to lower
The overall utilization rate thus shows the extent to which
measured total factor productivity differs from its trend.capacity utilization. In 1982, 3.8% of the 13.4% was due to
changes in the factor mix, and the rest to changes in
capacity utilization. Thus about 3.5 to 4.5 percentage points
of the post—1973 productivity decline (as before, relative to
the steady growth case) are due to changes in the mix of
energy, capital, and labour.
As is well known, the major reason for changes in the
factor mix since 1973 has been the sharp increase in the
price of energy. Given the lags and costs in adjusting factor
proportions, the full effects take time to work out, but they
have been very important over the 1974 to 1982 period. The
actual 1982 user price of energy, relative to the actual 1982
wage rate was 2.27 times as high as the corresponding 1982
ratio in the steady growth case. If desired output and all
other prices were held constant, this would lead eventually
to a 64% increase in the equilibrium ratio of labour to
energy. The actual 1982 increase, relative to the steady
growth case, was, at 42%, less than that, partly because the
effects of the higher energy prices have not fully worked
themselves out, and partly because of cyclical factors
combined with different adjustment speeds for capital,
labour, and energy. The model with shocks captures almost all
of these effects, since it gives a 1982 ratio of labour to
energy that is 44% higher than in the steady growth case.
This compares very closely with the actual increase of 42% in
the labour/energy ratio relative to the steady growth case.
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Some have suggested (e.g. Lindbeck 1983) that
capital-labour substitution may have been responsible for
lower post-1973 rates of growth of labour productivity in
several countries. In the Canadian case, the figures in Table
3.1 show that the capital intensity of production, as
measured by the ratio of the capital stock to potential
output, is the same as it would have been in the steady
growth case. There has been a decline in the capital-labour
ratio, but it has been due to the substitution of labour for
energy, with capital intensity unchanged. In the MACE
production structure, a higher energy price leads to
substitution of capital for energy in the capital-plus-energy
bundle, while the higher price of the capital-plus-energy
bundle leads to the use of more labour and less of the
capital-plus-energy bundle. For given levels of desired
output, the net effect of an increase in the energy price is
to lower the demand for energy and to raise the demand for
labour, leaving the demand for capital unaffected'. It is for
this reason that the factor substitution portions of the
productivity pies in Figure 3.1 have been labelled as 'energy
saving' ,sincethe additional labour used was in substitution
for energy rather than capital.
How well does the production sector of MACE explain the
productivity slowdown, and what are the factors responsible?
'Naturallythere is a decline in the profitability of using
old energy-using capital. This then contributes to a
temporary drop in production, labour productivity and
investment.The various elements of the MACE explanation are drawn
together in Figure 3.1, which shows the factors directly
responsible for differences between actual and steady growth
output per employee in 1981 and 1982. Both years lie outside
the estimation period for the equations.
The pie segments labelled "energy saving" show the
factor substitution effects described above, while the other
segments are derived from the equation explaining q/qsv in
terms of unexpected sales, profitability and the difference
between actual and desired inventories.5 The segments marked
"residual" represent the error in the production equation in
the two years.
What do the results suggest? First, they show that most
of the decline in labour productivity relative to the steady
growth case is explained by the MACE production equations:
96% in 1981 and 82% in 1982. Second, there is more to explain
in 1982 than 1981, and the demand variables play a large part
in the explanation. The large residual in 1982 requires some
discussion. Since this residual was 0.4% in 1981, the 2.4%
error in 1982 is almost surely linked to the failure of the
production equation to capture the large negative change in
inventories in 1982. To the extent that this sharp drop in
In the pie charts, the inventory stock effects, which would
have been small negative slices in the pie, and hence hard to
represent, have been used to reduce the sales and
profitability effects. The size of the inventory stock effect
was 0.6% in 1982, and much smaller in 1981. In both years
actual inventories were below their normal relation to the
capital stock, and hence should have led to a higher
utilization rate.
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inventories was due to a liquidity squeeze or to temporarily
pessimistic expectations of future sales, then it is likely
to be reversed as the recession ends. To the extent that it
is linked to a longer term pessimism, it is likely to affect
fixed capital spending also, and hence to keep the rebound of
the economy below the fairly rapid rates suggested by the
model for 1983 and 1984.
In either event, the inventory rundown of 1982, and the
associated low levels of production do not provide evidence
of long—run productivity problems. Even if they did, by far
the largest proportion of the decline in output per worker is
explained by changing factor proportions and abnormally low
sales and profitability. Thus there does not appear to be
strong evidence of a "productivity puzzle" requiring
explanation in terms of increasing regulatory burdens,
declining R & D, changes in the labour force mix, the growth
of the underground economy, or any of the other structural
factors that have been invoked to explain the post—1973
productivity declines.
Having argued that the drop in output per worker has
been largely due to factor prices, sales, and profitability,
it is now necessary to explain how and why these factors,
which are endogenous variables rather than exogenous shocks,
moved so adversely in the 1974-81 period.
But first, how do our results relate to other research
on the post—1973 declines in productivity growth? I am notfamiliar with any studies that have attempted, as we have
done, to explain aggregate productivity change in a framework
that treats capacity utilization and factor substitution in
an integrated and consistent way. The Economic Council of
Canada (1980) identified a post-1973 "productivity puzzle" in
its Seventeenth Annual Review, and thereafter launched a
series of further empirical studies, many of which focussed
on particular industries.
One of these studies, by Rao and Preston (1982),
attempts to unravel the puzzle by estimating translog cost
share equations as a means of discovering how much of the
post-1973 slowdown in productivity growth could be attributed
to factor substitution. Unfortunately, the model and the
estimation method require the assumption that production and
factor use are in continual equilibrium. This has the effect
of leaving capacity utilization effects as part of an
unexplained catch-all residual or, worse yet, getting
capacity utilization effects mixed up with estimated
economies of scale or factor substitution possibilities. A
number of other Canadian studies, mostly of the same sort,
are usefully surveyed by Denny and Fuss (1982).
At the aggregate level, Jarrett and Selody (1982) have
attempted reduced-form estimation of a link between inflation
and productivity, and have used their results to infer that
"...theincreased inflation rates of the 1970s are
sufficient to explain the entire recent slowdown in
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productivity growth." The correlation that they have foundis
not inconsistent with our results, since the inflation
induced by the external stagflationary shocks is surely
correlated with, and may even lead, the induced changes in
productivity. To experiment with causality tests between
jointly endogenous variables invites false inferences, such
as the conclusion that the consequence arriving first (e.g.
inflation) in some sense "explains" the consequence arriving
second. This would in turn invite the equally false inference
that any policy that stopped Canadian inflation in the 1970s
would also have removed the productivity slowdowns. To the
extent that both were caused by exogenous stagflationary
shocks, the policy inference is probably backwards, in that
stronger anti-inflationary policies would have changedthe
mix of output and price responses, and could have easily, by
acting on capacity utilization, have made the productivity
declines even larger.
Bruno (1982) has attempted to avoid these problems to
some extent by using cross sectional data in areduced-form
analysis of inter-country differences in productivitydecline
in manufacturing. He attributed roughly 60% of the
productivity decline to changes &n materials price changes
and 40% to the slowdown of demand. Since the relative size of
the absorption changes is probably correlated with the
relative size of export reductions, the absorption variable
is probably picking up some of the external demand effect,
while his estimated effect of raw materials price changesmust include both the input substitution effects as well as
some induced utilization effects, to the extent that the
latter were not otherwise captured by the absorption
variable. While Bruno's results appear to be consistent with
ours, it is not possible to make them fully comparable with
the results from our more structural approach.
Finally, if it is true, as the research with MACE
suggests, that a large part of the post-1973 decline in
output per employee is due to low utilization, the same
pattern ought to show up even more markedly in the evidence
from the 1930s. It does. Real GNP per employee rose, on
average, by 3.3% annually from 1926 to 1929, fell by 10.2%
annually from 1929 to 1933, and rose by 6.5% per annum from
1933 to 1936.
4. Sources of Stagflation and Output Decline
Curves I and 2 of Figure 4.1 show the steady growth and
actual historical values of real GNP over the 1974 to 1981
period. Curve 3 shows what would have happened to the steady
growth path if world oil prices had followed their actual
path but if foreign real income and prices had remained on
steady growth paths. For all of the results shown in Figure
4.1, Canadian crude oil prices are set at world levels, with
natural gas priced at btu parity with crude oil. Under the
world oil price shock, Canadian GNP falls well below the
steady growth path after the 1974 oil price increases,
converges towards the steady growth path as the oil price
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growth slows down, and then diverges again after the 1979-80
oil price shock. The effects on the Canadian economy depend
crucially on the type of monetary policy assumed. In all of
the results reported in this section, the monetary policy is
based on the estimated interest—rate reaction function. Since
the interest rates determined by the reaction function depend
largely on interest rates in the United States, on the level
of foreign exchange reserves, and on the rate of growth of
government debt, with some influence from the rate of growth
of the money supply (no separate role could be found for the
inflation rate), there is little increase in interest rates
but a very substantial temporary increase in the rate of
growth of the money supply after each of the OPEC price
shocks. The annual rate of growth of. high-powered money is
over 21% in 1974, drops to less than 10% in 1977 and 1978, is
11% in 1979, 17% in 1980, and then falls to less than 8% by
1982. The domestic inflation rate, as shown in Figure 4.2,
also takes large jumps (it is over 15% in 1974 and almost 13%
in 1980) at the time of each oil price increase, falling to
less-than—average rates between the two shocks.
The overall effect of the OPEC price shocks, in the
absence of world recession, and with an accommodating money
supply, is to give two large jumps in the inflation rate, and
two corresponding drops in the GNP growth rate. The oil price
increases therefore have important, but fairly transitory,
stagflationary effects. By 1982, the level of real GNP is
back to within 2% of the steady growth path, while the pricelevel remains 30% above that in the steady growth case. The
cumulative loss of real GNP over the nine years is about 30
billion 1971$.
Curve 4 in Figure 4.1 (as well as the corresponding
curve in Figure 4.2) shows what happens if international oil
prices and world activity and price levels are all set to
follow their actual paths. After the first OPEC shock, the
world recession was sharp but relatively short—lived, and the
additional negative effects on GNP are not very large. In
part this is due to the additional U.S. inflation, which is
reflected in large part in higher Canadian inflation as well.
As can be seen from Figure 4.2, the 1974 Canadian inflation
rate would have been 8% higher, from the additional impact of
world stagflation, and the inflation rate in curve 4
continues thereafter generally 2% to 4% higher than in curve
3. These higher general price levels serve to reduce the real
increase in the oil price, which is set exogenously in terms
of U.s. dollars. The extra inflation cumulates to give a 1982
GNP price level that is 80% higher than in the steady growth
case.
The effects of the world stagflation on Canadian real
GNP are especially large after the second oil shock; by 1982
annual GNP in this case is 19 billion 1971$ less than in the
price shock curve 3. Relative to the steady growth case, the
cumulative loss of GNP to the end of 1982 is over 80 billion
1971$. As can be seen from Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the OPEC oil
2122
price shocks and the associated world stagflation explain
most of the loss of output growth, and the higher inflation,
that Canada has experienced since 1973.
The cumulative average annual productivity increase from
1972 to 1982 in the OPEC case without world stagflation is
only one-half what it is in the steady growth case, asit
drops from 1.8% to 0.9% per year. Since real GNP in1982
under the OPEC price shocks is only 2% below its steady
growth level, these results show how misleading it canbe to
use labour productivity as a measure of welfare whenrelative
factor prices are changing. In the case of energy price
increases without world stagflation, the drop in labour
productivity is almost entirely due to the resulting
substitution of labour for energy in order to achieve least
cost production.
When the effects of world stagflation are added, as they
are in curve 4, there are offsetting consequences for
productivity growth. On the one hand, the slump in export
demand lowers the rate of capacity utilization, and hence the
amount of output per employee. On the other hand, the risein
the general world inflation rate serves to dampen the size of
the real increase in the world oil prices, and thus to limit
the substitution of labour for energy. The utilization rate
effect is larger, and hence labour productivity growth is
lower with the world stagflation than without it.
5. The Effects of Domestic PoliciesFigures 5.1 and 5.2 show the real GNP and inflation
effects of changes in Canadian macroeconomic policy since
1973, while Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the effects of
alternative energy pricing policies. The first two curves on
all the figures show history and steady growth. In the first
Set of figures (5.1 and 5.2) the third curve shows the
effects of OPEC prices and world stagflation combined (curve
4 in Figures 4.1 and 4.2). This section thus starts off where
the last section finished. The first set of figures shows
first (in curve 4) the effects of the 1976—78 Anti—Inflation
Board (AIB) and then (in curve 5) the effects of moving all
tax rates and government expenditures to their actual values,
and reintroducing the estimated effects on wages of changes
in unemployment insurance premiums and benefits. The effects
of actual interest rate and exchange rate policy, compared to
the reaction functions used, are shown by comparing curve 5
in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 with curve 3 in Figures 5.3 and 5.4,
since the latter curve has interest rates, as well as all tax
rates and government spending and transfers, held at their
actual values, and uses the actual rather than lagged
exchange rate as the starting point for exchange market
intervention.
Turning to the results themselves, the key effect of the
MB was to reduce nominal (and real) wage rates, leading
indirectly to a lower price level. Assuming the use of world
oil prices in Canada the cumulative wage level effects of the
MB amount to 20%, and the cumulative price level effects
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(using the GNP deflator) to 13%, thus giving a 7% drop in the
real wage. The effects on real GNP depend entirely on the
type of monetary and and exchange rate policy assumed. In an
earlier paper (Helliwell, 1982), the effects of the MB were
analyzed using a monetary policy focussed on the money supply
and real interest rates, and the exchange rate was allowed to
appreciate substantially. The lower prices, given the
relatively fixed money supply, gave sharply lower nominal
interest rates and increased real GNP substantially. In the
current analysis, in which the AIB is being added back in a
different policy environment, nominal interest rates fall
only slightly, real interest rates rise, and the combination
of higher real interest rates and the transfer of incomes
from employees to employers combine to reduce slightly both
consumption and investment spending, and hence GNP.
The effects of the AIB on labour productivity are fairly
substantial, as the lower real wage causes more labour to be
used relative to capital and energy. Output per employee in
1982 is 4% lower with the AIB, and the 1982 use of energy per
unit of labour is lower by 6%, reflecting the relative
increase in the demand for labour in response to the lower
real wage.
Government spending and taxation policies combined give
slightly higher level of GNP and slightly higher inflation
than the steady growth alternatives. In the steady growth
case, real government spending grows at 2% every year; inactual history it grew at an average rate of 1.7% from 1973
to 1982, but at a faster rate (4.6%) from 1973 to 1975, and
at a slower rate (0.9%) on average since then. The overall
effect of moving from the steady growth fiscal policies to
the actual ones, combining all policies (including the AIB)
and all levels of government, was to add 10 billion 1971$ to
cumulative GNP between 1974 and 1982, and to reduce the 1982
price level by 10%, using the steady growth monetary and
exchange rate policies, and using world oil prices in Canada.
Adding actual monetary and exchange rate policies,
instead of the equations used in the earlier cases, makes
only a slight additional effect on GNP, although the
resulting price of foreign exchange is substantially higher.
In part this reflects the fact that a devaluation in MACE
does not have much net expansionary impact on GNP after
induced inflation is taken into account.
Putting all of the domestic aggregate fiscal and
monetary policies together, their combined impact on real GNP
is fairly small relative to the size of the external shocks
analyzed in the last section. All of the analysis in this
section has assumed that Canadians paid world prices for
crude oil throughout the 1974 to 1982 period. In fact,
however, the domestic oil price increases have been much more
gradual, and the domestic city-gate crude oil price has been
well below the world price imediately after each of the world
oil price shocks.
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To illustrate, the Canadian price was less than 60% of
the landed price of imported oil in 1974, rose to about 80%
by 1978, fell to 52% in 1980, and thereafter rose to 80% in
1982 and over 90% from 1983 on. After each of the OPEC price
increases, welihead oil prices were held down by federal
government regulation until agreed pricing and taxation
arrangements could be developed between the federal
government and the governments of the producing provinces.
After 1973-74, the agreed resolution involved fixed nominal
price increases ($1 per barrel each six months) towards the
world price, with the federal government financing the
subsidy on imported oil. The 1979-80 world oil price
increases hiked the net annual economic rents from Canadian
crude oil and natural gas (measured relative to world prices,
and after allowing for losses of potential rents by having
domestic prices below world levels) from less than $10
billion in 1978 to $21.6 billion in 1980, or 7% of GNP.
Because of the import subsidy (more than $3 billion
annually), a small federal tax share, and low user prices,
the federal share of the $21.6 billion was —3%, the
provincial share 26%, the producer share 17%, and the energy
users' share 56%, with the rest accruing to natural gas
export customers.
The federal National Energy Program of late October,
1980, established higher federal taxes, unilaterally set
producer prices, and raised user prices to finance the
subsidies for synthetic and imported oil. The policy wasrejected by Alberta, and a year of stalemate followed. The
federal—provincial energy agreements of late 1981 established
the world oil price for all new and synthetic oil production,
set a schedule of price increases to move the price of old
conventional oil to 75% of the world price, and established a
number of new federal taxes and charges, including a levy to
finance new acquisitions by PetroCan, the federally-owned oil
company. In 1982, this raised the federal share of the total
rents to 27%, equal to the provincial share, with the
producer share at 8% and the energy users' share at 38%.
We have assessed the macroeconomic effects of these
actual policies against the 1980 Alberta pricing proposals
(the detailed assumptions of the two cases are spelled out in
Helliwell and McRae (1982)) and against the world price
alterative used earlier in this paper. The Alberta proposals
involved user prices similar to those in the actual policies.
These prices mainly affected the split between between levels
of government, and between government and industry. Since
there were no significant macroeconomic differences between
the two cases, only the actual policies and the world price
alternatives are shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
The effect of the phased and lagged increases in
domestic energy prices was to reduce the initial
stagflationary impacts of the increases in world oil prices.
For example, under the actual policies the inflation rate was
lower by 8 percentage points in 1974 and by 4 percentage
2728
points in 1980. Growth of real GNP under the actual policies,
relative to the world price policies, was 1.5% higher in 1974
and 0.4% higher in 1980. However, these gains in the impact
years were dissipated later on as the pricing adjustments
were made. By the end of 1982, cumulative GNP was almost
indentical, and the price of GNP only slightly lower with the
actual policies.
Measured labour productivity is higher under actual
prices than under world prices. This effect is entirely due
to the fact that there has been less substitution of labour
for energy under the actual energy pricing policies.
It is interesting to ask by how much the 1982 recession
is due to Canadian energy prices rising later than elsewhere
in the world. The results suggest that 1982 GNP growth would
have been 1.3% higher, and the rate of inflation 2% lower,
had domestic energy prices followed the world prices rather
than their actual path.
The U.S. inflation rate has been added to Figure 5.4 to
show how the Canadian energy pricing policies in the
post—1979 period shifted the Canadian inflation rate out of
alignment with the U.S. rate. The U.S. inflation rate peaked
in 1980, as the Canadian rate would have done under the world
pricing case. Under the actual policies, the peak inflation
rate was shifted forward to 1981.Combining the effects of domestic macroeconomic and
energy policies, we have the comparison between curve 4 in
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 and curve 4 in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
Cumulative GNP is almost identical in the two cases. The wage
level in 1982 is 8% lower, and the GNP price 2% higher in the
"policy" case than in the "no policy" case, with resulting
impacts on labour productivity. This impact on the nominal
and real wage is a consequence of the AIB.
By comparing curve 1 and curve 4 on Figures 5.3 and 5.4
we can see the overall ability of the model as a whole to
explain real GNP and inflation from 1974 through 1982. The
model tracks the pattern and turning points of GNP and
inflation rates and, as reported in detail in Table 2.1,
explains most (and sometimes more than all) of the 1982
divergences between the actual and steady growth paths.
6. Conclusion
What inferences can be drawn from the foregoing
econometric decomposition and reconstruction of history? On
the productivity question, the results provide fairly strong
evidence that one-quarter or two—fifths of the post-1973 drop
in aggregate productivity (depending on whether 1982 or 1981
is used as the terminal year) is due to changes in factor
proportions, induced by higher energy prices, with almost all
of the rest caused by decreases in capacity utilization due
to low sales and profitability. In terms of underlying
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causes, almost all of the changesin factor proportions,
sales, and profitability were due to the OPECoil price
shocks and the related changes in inflation and real GNP
elsewhere in the world.
Given the relative importance of capacity utilization as
a determinant of post-1973 productivity changes,it seems
inappropriate to study measured productivity change, as many
researchers continue to do, by means of production modelsand
factor share equations that assume that there have been no
systematic changes in capacity utilization. Todo so not only
fails to estimate the important role of changes in capacity
utilization, but almost guarantees the misestimation ofother
key parameters, such as the factorsubstitution possibilities
and economies of scale.
On the role of policy, the results suggest that the
aggregate role of changes in government spending,taxation,
and energy policies was to smooth slightly the pathof
adjustment of GNP and prices to the OPEC shocks,but with
little or no effect on cumulative GNP, and at the costof a
slight worsening of the 1982 recession.
What are the key puzzles that remain? On the basisof
the preliminary data for 1982, the model is unable toaccount
for the substantial reductions in consumption, andthe very
large inventory reductions that were so importantin making
the 1982 recession as sharp as it was. If outputin 1983 and
1984 remains below potential output to the same extent asin1982, and if these low levels of output are not adequately
explained by cyclical variables, then there will be a
substantial productivity puzzle remaining. While this
evidence is still accumulating, it is intended to apply a
similar framework to the aggregate evidence from other
industrial countries, and to assess the reasons for
international differences in stagflation and productivity
growth.
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APPENDIX




* denotesdesired value, e.g., k.mv
denotes quantity given by a CES bundle, e.g., key
—denotesa two period average, e.g., ne =ne
+kne_i)
—t denotes a lag of t years, e.g., q_1
denotes equilibrium value at normal capacity utilization after lags
are worked out, e.g., mne
• denotes one—period proportionate change, e.g.,
=aa-i"a-i
Variable Equation No. Description
a 2.3 Real absorption, billion 1971 $
c 1.10 Production costs relative to output price
q forq
D Dummy variable in labour force equation,
aib equal to 1 in 1976 and —i in 1978, to
account for effects of anti—inflation
board policies
e 1.8 Energy expenditure, billion 1971 $
e 1.4 Vintage—based energy requirement, billion V 1971$A- 2
Variable Equation No. Description
1.13 Value of physical change in inventories,
billion 1971 $
i 1.1 Business fixed investment (excluding ne
energy investment), billion 1971 $
knew 1.3 Re—investment with energy use malleable in
the current year, billion 1971 $
key 1.3 Vintage measure of capital and energy,
billion 1971 $
k. 1.14 Stock of inventories, billion 1971 $
1 flV
kne
1.2 Business fixed capital stock (excluding
energy), billion 1971 $
M.d
4.5 Interest and dividend payments to
1
foreigners,billion $
m 1.12 Imports of goods and services (excluding ne
energy, interest, and dividends), billion
1971 $
N 1.6 Total employed (excluding armed forces), e
millions of persons
N1
1.5 Total civilian labour force, millions of
persons
N Exogenous Population of labor force age, millions
p of persons
3.4 Implicit price of absorption, 1971 =1.0
Link Price of energy to final users, 1971 =1.0
mne 3.5 Price of imports of goods and services
(excluding energy), 1971 =1.0
p 3.2 Implicit price for output of the energy— q using sector.
q 1.11 Gross output (at factor cost) of the non—
energy sector, billion 1971 $.(Equals
real GDP plus net energy imports)A- 3
Variable Equation No. Description
1.15 Aggregate demand (output less unintended
inventory accumulation), billion 1971 $
q 1.9 Synthetic supply variable, billion 1971 $
*
q 1.16 Desired level of profitable future output
for investment demand, billion 1971 $
*
1.19 Desired level of profitable future output
for labour demand, billion 1971 $
1.17 Vintage-based synthetic supply, billion
1971 $
5.7 Average yield on Government of Canada
bonds, 10 years and over, percent
T. 5.1 Indirect taxes less subsidies, billion $
w 3.1 Wage rate, thousands of dollars per year
per employed person
X.d
2.10 Interest and dividend receipts from non—
1 residents,billion $
y Exogenous Residual error of estimate, billion 1971 $ res
Estimated Annual rate at which energy/capital
- parameter proportions become malleable in kev• 8i =
.72
82 Exogenous Depreciation rate for non—energy capital
stock (including housing). 8.05
fl Estimated Labour productivity index for Harrod-
neutral technical progress in Cobb-Douglas
function for q. The annual growth rate is
1.99 per cent
Exogenous Real supply price of capital, percent.
=7.0
a, , Estimated Parameters for nested production
y, a parameters functions, a =.356;=.70584;y =
.10831;a =.6A-4
MACE Equations for Supply and Factor Demands
(1.1) Business fixed investment:





2SLS 1954—1980: s.e.e =.00296; .823; Durbin—h =1.11
(1.2) Business fixed capital stock:
k =(i-ô)k+i
ne 2 ne—i ne
(1.3)Vintage bundle of capital and energy:
a
— Ypa-i a—i
k =(1_ôi_82)kev_i÷ new +' ]
whereknew =ne
+ôikne_iis re—investment with energy use
malleable in the current year.
(1.4)Vintage-based energy requirement:
e =(1—6—o)e÷ (—)i
V 12 v-i e new).- 5
(1.5)Labour force:






+ .0083121 D —.15562
aib
(3.12) (3.10)
2SLS 1956—1980: s.e.e. =.00377 =.650DW =1.66
F—test on constraint that constant plus coefficients on the
1st 2nd and 4th terms sum to zero =1.03
(1.6)Employment:
q k1-a




2SLS 1954 —1980:s.e.e. =.0595; =.9987




in e =ine + .010024t—.69028 V
(23.22)(23.54)








1 3.5196 k —
1—a a 1-a a 1-a
(1—a) k
where k (ô2+ 1Pr)Pais the price of capital services.
(1.10)Average unit cost,relative to output, price for producing
grossoutputof the non—energy sector:













wherek. =.12423k mv ne
2SLS 1954 —1980;s.e.e. .00727; R2 =.9996;D—W =1.29










2SLS1955 —1980:s.e.e =.0549; =.9826;D—W =.83
F—test on constraint on q =.853
sv
where imports of cars from the U.S. is given by




(1.13) change in business inventories:
i =q+Trn/p-a-x+m -M/p +M/p-y mv 1q ne neid q id mneres




q q —[i.—.08(k. —k.
a mv mv mv
(1.16) Desired level of future output for investment demand:
=q[1+2.5(m-rn,/q]q/q_2
where mis the equilibrium level of imports at full capacity
with lags worked out
P
- in(m—m )= —1.5850+inq —1.0302in
uuie
ne car2 sv pq
(1.17) Vintage based synthetic supply:
a 1-a
q =3.5196(i) (n N) sv ev e
(1.19) Desired level of future output for labour demand:
=.65q[1 +1.3(m_m)/q]q/q...2
+(1..65)9.5153(flNg)2/(11..2N_2)
OLS 1966 —1980:s.e.e. =.104; =.936;D—W =1.15Al -9




whereinis the equilibrium level of imports at full capacity
with lags worked out




Vintage based synthetic supply:
a 1—a
(1.17) q 3.5196 (k )(iiN ) sv ev e
Desired level of future output for labour demand:















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 FIGURE 3.1: SOURCES OF LOW LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
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